FRAMING THE CONSTITUTION

By Delegate James Madison.

MADISON'S services in framing the Constitution were eminent. Historians are agreed that the Constitution bears the stamp of his hand more notably than that of any other. To Madison also we are indebted for the completest and only adequate report of the Constitutional convention of 1787.

In an introduction to his report of these proceeding of June 27, 28 and 29, Madison writes that "I chose a seat in front of the presiding member, with the other members on my right and left hands. In this favorable position for hearing all that passed, I noted in terms legible and in abbreviations intelligible to myself, what was read from the chair or spoken by the members.

. . . I was not absent a single day, and was enabled to write out my notes during the session."

MR. RUTLEDGE moved to postpone the sixth resolution, defining the powers of Congress, in order to take up the seventh and eighth, which involved the most fundamental points, the rules of suffrage in the two branches, which was agreed to. A question being proposed on the seventh resolution, declaring that the suffrage in the first branch should be according to an equitable ratio, Mr. L. Martin contended at great length and with great eagerness that the general government was meant merely to preserve the State governments, not to govern individuals. That its powers ought to be kept within narrow limits. That, if too little power was given to it, more might be added; but that, if too much, it could never be resumed. That individuals, as such, have little to do but with their own States, that the general government has no more to apprehend from the States composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures, than a government over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects. That to resort to the citizens at large for their sanction to a new government will be throwing them back into a state of nature; that the dissolution of the State Governments is involved in the nature of the process; that the people have no right to do this without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for State purposes. Through their tongues only they can speak, through their ears only can hear. That the States have shown a good disposition to comply with the acts of Congress, weak, contemptibly weak, as that body has been; and have failed through inability alone to comply. That the heaviness of the private debts and the waste of property during the war were the chief causes of this inability, that he did not conceive the instances mentioned by Mr. Madison of compacts between Virginia and Maryland, between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or of troops raised by Massachusetts for defense against the rebels, to be violations of the Articles of Confederation. That an equal vote in each State was essential to the Federal idea, and was founded in justice and freedom, not merely in policy. That though the States may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they had not, and ought not. That the States, like individuals, were in a state of nature equally sovereign and free.

In order to prove that individuals in a state of nature are equally free and independent, he read passages from Locke, Vattel, Lord Somers, Priestley. To prove that the case is the same with States till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke and Vattel, and also Rutherford. That the States, being equal, cannot treat or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes without giving up their liberty. That the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for ten States. That, as Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have forty-two ninetieths of the votes, they can do as they please without a miraculous union of the other ten. That they will have nothing to do but to gain over one of the ten, to make them complete masters of the rest; that they can then appoint an Executive and Judiciary and Legislature for them as they please. That there was, and would continue, a natural predilection and partiality in men for their own States; that the States, particularly the smaller, would never allow a negative to be exercised over their laws; that no State in ratifying the Confederation had objected to the equality of votes; that the complaints at present ran not against this equality, but the want of power. That sixteen members from Virginia would be more likely to act in concert than a like number formed of members from different States. That, instead of a junction of the small States as a remedy, he thought a division of the large States would be more eligible. This was the substance of a speech which was continued more than three hours. He was too much exhausted, he said, to finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he should to-morrow resume them.

Adjourned.

Mr. L. Martin resumed his discourse, contending that the General Government ought to be formed for the States, not for individuals; that, if the States were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people, it would be the same thing whether their representatives were chosen by the legislatures or the people, the smaller States would be equally enslaved. That, if the large States have the same interest with the smaller, as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an equal vote, they would not injure themselves, and they could not injure the large ones, on that supposition without injuring themselves; and, if the interests were not the same, the inequality of suffrage would be dangerous to the smaller States. That it will be in vain to propose any plan offensive to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the people will certainly prevent their adopting it. That the large States were weak at present in proportion to their extent, and could only be made formidable to the small ones by the weight of their votes. That, in case a dissolution of the Union should take place, the small States would have nothing to fear from their power; that, if, in such a case, the three great States should league themselves together, the other ten could do so, too; and that he had rather see partial confederacies take place than the plan on the table. This was the substance of the residue of his discourse, which was delivered with much diffuseness and considerable vehemence.

Mr. Lansing and Mr. Dayton moved to strike out not," so that the seventh article might read "that the right of suffrage in the first branch ought to be according to the rule established by the Confederation."

Mr. Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put till to-morrow, Governor Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and the representation of New Jersey thereby suspended.

Mr. Williamson thought that, if any political truth could be grounded on mathematical demonstration, it was that, if the States were equally sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the smaller States would be injured in the case, and wished some gentleman would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small States, if they had a plurality of votes, would have an interest in throwing the burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged that the expected addition of new States from the westward might be taken into view. They would be small States, they would be poor States, they would be unable to pay in proportion to their numbers, their distance from market rendering the produce of their labor less valuable; they would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying burdens on commerce and consumption, which would fall with greater weight on the old States.

Mr. Madison said he was much disposed to concur in any expedient, not inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor that it was necessary for the safety of the small States against the large States. That it was not just had been conceded by Mr. Brearly and Mr. Patterson themselves. The expedient proposed by them was a new partition of the territory of the United States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of sovereign States in the formation of compacts lay in confounding mere treaties, in which were specified certain duties to which the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which their subjects were to be reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a compact by which an authority was created paramount to the parties, and making laws for the government of them. if France, England and Spain were to enter into a treaty for the regulation of commerce, etc., with the Prince of Monaco, and four or five other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would not hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regulations perfectly reciprocal. Would the case be the same if a council were to be formed of deputies from each, with authority and discretion to raise money, levy troops, determine the value of coin, etc.? Would thirty or forty millions of people submit their fortunes into the hands of a few thousands? If they did, it would only prove that they expected more from the terror of their superior force than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble associates. Why are counties of the same States represented in proportion to their numbers? Is it because the representatives are chosen by the people themselves? So will be the representatives in the National legislature. Is it because the larger have more at stake than the smaller? The case will be the same with the larger and smaller States. Is it because the laws are to operate immediately on their persons and properties? The same is the case, in some degree, as the Articles of Confederation stand; the same will be the case, in a far greater degree, under the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of captures, of piracies, and of offenses in a Federal army, the property and persons of individuals depend on the laws of Congress. By the plan proposed a complete power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy, is proposed to be vested in the National government. Many other powers are added which assimilate it to the government of individual States. The negative proposed on the State laws will make it an essential branch of the State legislatures, and of course will require that it should be exercised by a body established on like principles with the branches of those legislatures. That it is not necessary to secure the small States against the large ones, he conceived to be equally obvious.