THE BATTLE OF SAN JUAN HILL

By Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.

A FEW days before the Rough Riders made their famous charge up San Juan Hill, as Roosevelt relates in his "Auto- biography," from which this account is taken, by permission of the Macmillan Company, he was made a full colonel of volunteers because of his gallantry at Las Guasimas. At both Las Guasimas and San Juan the Rough Riders, then commanded by Wood and Roosevelt, fought on foot, the horses of the regiment not having been transported to Cuba. As a result of these two engagements Colonel Wood was made a brigadier-general.

Colonel Roosevelt characteristically states here that he "had not enjoyed the Guasimas fight at all," probably because "only eight of the Rough Riders were killed and thirty-four wounded" out of the American loss of 1614 killed and wounded in the Santiago campaign. It ended July 15, 1898, with the capitulation of Santiago.

COL. ROOSEVELT LEADING "THE CHARGE UP SAN JUAN HILL"

FROM THE PAINTING BY FREDERIC REMINGTON

I HAD not enjoyed the Guasimas fight at all, because I had been so uncertain as to what I ought to do. But the San Juan fight was entirely different. The Spaniards had a hard position to attack, it is true, but we could see them, and I knew exactly how to proceed. I kept on horseback, merely because I found it difficult to convey orders along the line, as the men were lying down ; and it is always hard to get men to start when they cannot see whether their comrades are also going. So I rode up and down the lines, keeping them straightened out, and gradually worked through line after line until I found myself at the head of the regiment. By the time I had reached the lines of the regulars of the first brigade I had come to the conclusion that it was silly to stay in the valley firing at the hills, because that was really where we were most exposed, and that the thing to do was to try to rush the intrenchments. Where I struck the regulars there was no one of superior rank to mine, and after asking why they did not charge, and being answered that they had no orders, I said I would give the order. There was naturally a little reluctance shown by the elderly officer in command to accept my order, so I said, "Then let my men through, sir," and I marched through followed by my grinning men. The younger officers and the enlisted men of the regulars jumped up and joined US. I waved my hat, and we went up the hill with a rush. Having taken it, we looked across at the Spaniards in the trenches under the San Juan blockhouse to our left, which Hawkins's brigade was assaulting. I ordered our men to open fire on the Spaniards in the trenches.

Memory plays funny tricks in such a fight, where things happen quickly, and all kinds of mental images succeed one another in a detached kind of way, while the work goes on. As I gave the order in question there slipped through my mind Mahan's account of Nelson's orders that each ship as it sailed forward, if it saw another ship engaged with an enemy's ship, should rake the latter as it passed. When Hawkins's soldiers captured the blockhouse, 1, very much elated, ordered a charge on my own hook to a line of hills still farther on. Hardly anybody heard this order, however; only four men started with me, three of whom were shot. I gave one of them, who was only wounded, my canteen of water, and ran back, much irritated that I had not been followed which was quite unjustifiable, because I found that nobody had heard my orders. General Sumner had come up by this time, and I asked his permission to lead the charge. He ordered me to do so, and this time away we went, and stormed the Spanish intrenchments.

There was some close fighting, and we took a few prisoners. We also captured the Spanish provisions, and ate them that night with great relish. . . . Lieutenant Howze, of the regulars, an aide of General Sumner's, brought me an order to halt where I was ; he could not make up his mind to return until he had spent an hour or two with us under fire. The Spaniards attempted a counter-attack in the middle of the afternoon, but were driven back without effort, our men laughing and cheering as they rose to fire, because hitherto they had been assaulting breastworks or lying still under artillery fire, and they were glad to get a chance to shoot at the Spaniards in the open. We lay on our arms that night and as we were drenched with sweat, and had no blankets save a few we took from the dead Spaniards, we found even the tropic night chilly before morning came.

During the afternoon's fighting, while I was the highest officer at our immediate part of the front, Captains Boughton and Morton of the regular cavalry, . . . came along the firing line to tell me that they had heard a rumor that we might fall back, and that they wished to record their emphatic protest against any such course. I did not believe that there was any truth in the rumor, for the Spaniards were utterly incapable of any effective counter-attack. . . . In my part of the line the advance was halted only because we received orders not to move forward, but to stay on the crest of the captured hill and hold it.

We are always told that three-o'clock-in-the-morning courage is the most desirable kind. Well, my men and the regulars of the cavalry had just that brand of courage. At about three o'clock in the morning after the first fight, shooting began in our front and there was an alarm of a Spanish advance. I was never more pleased than to see the way in which the hungry, tired, shabby men all jumped up and ran forward to the hill-crest, so as to be ready for the attack ; which, however, did not come. As soon as the sun rose the Spaniards again opened upon us with artillery.

Next day the fight turned into a siege ; there were some stirring incidents ; but for the most part it was trench work. A fortnight later Santiago surrendered.