The restoration of confidence in the intention and ability of the government to maintain the gold standard, which was needed to check this drain upon the gold reserve, was immediately accomplished by the election itself. Shortly before the election, call money was quoted at 125 per cent in Wall Street and "a long line of private individuals stood outside the United States sub-treasury's redemption window to exchange their legal tenders for gold coin. This state of affairs ended abruptly November 4, when election results were known. Money rates fell in a week to four per cent; within a day, gold coin was presented at the same sub-treasury windows for conversion into legal tenders."

There was now no danger to the gold reserve, but in the campaign so much emphasis had been put upon the issue of sound money that loud demands were made, particularly by Democrats who had supported the Republican candidate, for legislation that would irrevocably fix upon gold as the single standard. On the Republican side it was claimed that the election was a victory for Protection as well as Sound Money, and McKinley, as the foremost Protectionist of the country, was expected to correct the adverse legislation of 1894.

Nor were the domestic problems the only ones requiring serious thought. The Cuban question was rapidly reaching a point when action of some kind on the part of the United States would soon be inevitable, and in addition there was the annexation of Hawaii still awaiting settlement, besides a pending treaty of arbitration with Great Britain, and numerous other matters of minor importance.

Rightly deciding that the first duty of the nation was to put its own house in order, the President in his Inaugural Address placed the emphasis upon the immediate necessity of providing adequate revenue. He called attention to the industrial disturbances from which the country was suffering and for which speedy relief must be had. He pointed to the necessity of a revision of the financial system, and declared that this could be accomplished "with adequate revenue secured, but not until then." To provide against increasing the public debt was the "mandate of duty, the certain and easy remedy for most of our financial difficulties." The receipts of the government must be made to equal or exceed the expenditures, otherwise a deficiency is inevitable. "While a large annual surplus of revenue may invite waste and extravagance, inadequate revenue creates distrust and undermines public and private credit." Deficiencies, he pointed out, can be met either by loans or by increased revenue. "Between more loans and more revenue there ought to be but one opinion. We should have more revenue, and that without delay, hindrance or postponement. A surplus in the Treasury created by loans is not a permanent nor safe reliance. . . . The best way for the government to maintain its credit is to pay as it goes not by resorting to loans, but by keeping out of debt through an adequate income secured by a system of taxation, external or internal, or both."

In these plain words so characteristic of McKinley for their simplicity and common sense, the President correctly indicated the starting-point where the country might expect to begin a successful rebuilding of its shattered industries. Revenue first, was the important consideration. The method of raising this necessary revenue must be through the restoration of the principles of the Protective Tariff. That, in the President's judgment, had been as clearly demanded by the people at the polls as the soundness of our money. He maintained that protective tariff legislation had "always been the firmest prop of the Treasury," and that the passage of such laws would strengthen the credit of the government both at home and abroad, and go far toward stopping the drain upon the gold reserve. With confidence restored, the revision of the currency laws could proceed with deliberation, until the right solution should be agreed upon.

Perhaps the public who heard or read these expressions in the Inaugural Address did not fully realize the shrewdness of judgment that lay behind them. The President knew that more revenue was not only imperatively demanded, but was obtainable at an early date. He also knew that any change in the currency laws intended to establish more securely the soundness of our money would be practically impossible under conditions then existing. The Fifty-fourth Congress, elected in 1894, was strongly Republican, and had already taken steps to prepare a tariff bill along the lines which the President would naturally favor. The Fifty-fifth Congress was also Republican in both branches, and on the Tariff the party was united. A bill to provide revenue along the lines of protection could therefore be expected to pass readily although as the event proved there were difficulties in the Senate. On the other hand, the prospect for such legislation on the currency as the country imperiously demanded was not so bright. The House was anti-Silver by a good majority, but this was not so in the Senate, where there were 46 Republicans, 34 Democrats, 5 Populists, 3 Independents, and 2 Silver Party men. The combined opposition were all in favor of free silver and could count at least four Republicans to act with them. Any attempt to pass a gold-standard measure through a Senate of such complexion would have been futile.

Under these circumstances, the President's determination to settle the Tariff question first of all, and for that purpose, to call an extra session of Congress immediately, was a wise one.