THE HUMAN SIDE OF PANAMA CANAL BUILDING

By George W. Goethals, U. S. A.

GENERAL GOETHALS, who became chairman of the Panama Canal Commission in 1907, and was Governor of the Canal Zone when the great waterway was completed in 1914 (a year ahead of scheduled time), published this account in "Scribner's Magazine," 1915, from which it is taken by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons. To the great work Goethals brought an adequate knowledge of engineering with a complete knowledge of army organization and cooperation.

Elsewhere he pays tribute to the remarkable work of sanitation done by Colonel William C. Gorgas, without which pioneer work it is doubtful if the Canal could ever have been completed.

His own work at the Canal finished, Goethals was successively general manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, acting quartermaster-general and chief of the division of purchase, storage and tragic U. S. Army; and in 1915 received the thanks of Congress for "distinguished service in constructing the Panama Canal."

THE general impression prevailed from the beginning that the building of the Panama Canal comprised one of the world's greatest engineering feats, and the tremendous scope of the work as it developed during the construction period served to mold this impression into a fixed belief; yet Mr. Stevens, who, for nearly two years had control on the Isthmus, not only of all construction, but of those various coordinate branches which were essential adjuncts to the building of the Canal, expressed the opinion that the engineering features were the least difficult, describing them as "of magnitude and not of intricacy." On the other hand, his experience convinced him that the administrative problems were the greater, presenting as they did many unusual features, involving an immense amount of detail and extending into every branch of business, with ramifications touching many phases of social and domestic economy.

In every undertaking of an engineering character there must necessarily be a greater or less amount of administrative detail resulting from problems of supply, labor, policy, and considerations arising out of them. In the case of the Panama Canal, not only were these problems present, but, as compared with those of engineering, they made the latter appear relatively small.

The very magnitude of the work imposed difficulties which would have existed even had it been undertaken in any portion of the United States, but these difficulties were increased materially by reason of having to carry on the work in a tropical country, sparsely populated, non-productive, affording no skilled and very little efficient common labor, with customs and modes of living as different as the civilizations of North and Central America have been since the settlement of these portions of the western hemisphere, with a heavy rainfall during the greater portion of the year, and with a reputation for unhealthfulness which placed Panama in the category of one of the worst pest-holes of the earth.

The forces of the United States were fortunate . . . for before the transfer of the work to them preventive medicine had made such advances as to make possible the conversion of the pest-hole into a habitat where most white men could live and work. The diseases which sapped the energy and vitality of the men and struck terror to their souls were malaria and yellow fever. The cause of the former had been discovered by Sir Ronald Ross, of the British army, who formulated rules by which an infected locality could be rid of its influences. Not only were his theory and practices known, but we had the benefit of his advice and experience, for he visited the, Isthmus on invitation of the commission at the instigation of the health authorities in order that we might have his assistance. After Sir Ronald Ross's discovery, Doctors Reed, Lazear, and Carroll, in Cuba, with Aristides Agramonte, a Cuban immune, proved the correctness of the theory advanced by Doctor Carlos Finlay, of Havana, that yellow fever was transmitted only by the mosquito, and prescribed the methods that resulted in ridding Cuba of that dread disease; it naturally followed that the Isthmus could be freed in the same way. Finally, great advances had been made in construction machinery of all kinds, making the equipment used by the French obsolete, though this was continued in use by the Americans until it could be replaced by the more modern and up-to-date appliances that experience had shown would accomplish the results.

Because of the reputation of Panama, difficulty was experienced in securing the necessary skilled and unskilled labor, but systems of recruiting had been worked out and were in satisfactory operation in 1907, when the force aggregated about 5,500 "gold" employees and 24,000 "silver," or common, laborers. Notwithstanding the fact that at this time the Isthmus had been freed from yellow fever, the dread of the tropics was still extant, making it difficult to secure American workmen.

The assembled force had to be housed and fed. Many houses were acquired from the French, but not sufficient for the needs, nor were they always accessible to the work in progress. Extensive building operations were undertaken, including the erection of offices, storehouses of various kinds, quarters, hotels, messes, kitchens, hospitals, and schools. (The arbitrary nomenclature that became current on the Isthmus is of interest. The terms "gold" and "silver," the former designating the high-grade employee, usually American, and the latter the lower grades, usually West Indian or European, are well known.

New settlements were located and constructed with a view of accessibility to the work. The terminal cities of Panama and Colon were without pavements, sewers, or running water, and under the treaty these were to be provided by the United States, reimbursement to be accomplished at the end of the fifty-year period. This work was in progress as well as similar improvements in the various settlements that were building or completed. Machine-shops were rehabilitated or added to, and new ones constructed for assembling the machinery purchased in the United States, for manufacturing parts in order to avoid the delay incident to securing them from the manufacturers, and for making repairs.

The commissary of the Panama Railroad was enlarged and an adequate cold-storage plant for the proper care of meats and the manufacture of ice was in course of construction; local commissaries were established at the various settlements; and a system of supply was in operation between the main commissary and those at the different localities, as well as with the hotels, messes, and kitchens.

Probably the most difficult problem was the feeding of the force. Boarding-houses and restaurants thrived, but not so the men, and the stories told, exaggerated no doubt with the passage of time, are of conditions which, to say the least, were decidedly unpleasant. A local contract was made for running a hotel at Culebra, and the subsistence privilege for the entire force was advertised and bids were received.

Thought and attention were given to the storage and distribution of construction supplies. A system was instituted for shipping material and equipment direct from the dock to the places where needed, preventing congestion and saving double handling. A large storehouse was erected for reserve supplies of all kinds that might be needed and without which delays to the work would result. The great distance from the source of production and supply, and the necessity for keeping the work going, made the supply of material a very important feature.

The Panama Railroad, constructed in 1850-5 by Americans with American capital, constituted a part of one of the through routes between the east and west ; its commercial interests had to be continued, and, in addition, it must assist in the construction of the Canal. The roadbed, equipment, and facilities were scarcely adequate for the former alone, and, with the immense quantities of supplies required for the Canal, they became totally inadequate. The road was double-tracked and rebuilt to suit the heavier equipment that had been ordered, round-houses were constructed, docks erected, and yards built at the terminals and at various places along the line for the handling of freight of all kinds and spoil from the Canal.

All of these various branches of the work came directly under the control of the chief engineer ; and it was necessary to coordinate them with the construction of the Canal. Under these circumstances, it can readily be seen that Mr. Stevens's conclusions, that the administrative problems were greater than those of engineering, were correct.

One of the departments on the Isthmus not yet touched upon, and a very important one, was that of government. Under the treaty, the United States obtained from Panama the control and jurisdiction of a strip of land across the Isthmus ten miles wide, five miles on either side of the center line of the Canal to be constructed, so that there were required, as soon as the transfer of the strip was effected, a code of laws, a fiscal system, and the other machinery necessary for the establishment of a form of government. While the Spooner Act gave the President authority to make such regulations and establish such tribunals as might be required to exercise the control under the treaty, Congress, by specific enactment, delegated to the President the exercise of civic, judicial, and military functions in the Zone, to be exercised through such person or persons as he might determine, but such delegation of authority was to cease with the expiration of the Fifty-eighth Congress (March 4, 1905). The President exercised this authority through the Isthmian Canal Commission, which became the legislative body, announced that the laws of the land would continue in force until changed by competent authority, and appointed a member of the commission as governor of the Canal Zone Major-General George W. Davis, U. S. A., who brought to the task valuable experience gained in Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands. At that time the Zone was divided into municipalities, each with its mayor, secretary, treasurer, and municipal council, so that a political organization was established for the government of the strip, but without the elective franchise. Laws were prescribed, courts established, police, fire force, postal system, customs service, and schools were organized as the needs of the situation demanded. This department also had charge of all questions that arose between the Republic of Panama and the Canal Zone. The governor was given the power of reprieve, pardon, and deportation. The Fifty-eighth Congress adjourned without legislating for the Canal or continuing the authority it had vested in the President, so that the commission lost its legislative functions. A de facto government had been established, however; the work had to proceed ; new conditions as they arose had to be met; so that President Roosevelt continued the government but legislated through the medium of Executive Orders.