BRITAIN FAILS AT GALLIPOLI

Lord Kitchener's Official Report as Minister of War.

THE aim of the disastrous Gallipoli Expedition was of course the capture of Constantinople. But after the landing of the British forces, mainly volunteers from Australia and New Zealand known as Anzacs, under General Hamilton, at Suvla Bay, August 8, 1915, and their defeat by the Turks, under Mustapha Kemal (later to become dictator of Turkey) the failure of the operation was a foregone conclusion.

The main British assault was the one here described by Lord Kitchener, then Minister of War, and by General Hamilton, commander-in-chief of the expedition. A feature of the heroic assault of August 9, when the British held the summit of Sari Bair for a short time, was the tragically mistaken shelling of the British troops by their own Warships. Other battles were fought with varying results in this campaign, in which the British lost more than 50,000 men, before it was abandoned.

ON the Gallipoli Peninsula during the operations in June several Turkish trenches were captured. Our own lines were appreciably advanced and our positions were consolidated.

Considerable reenforcements having arrived, a surprise landing on a large scale at Suvla Bay was successfully accomplished on the 6th of August without any serious opposition.

At the same time an attack was launched by the Australian and New Zealand corps from the Anzac position, and a strong offensive was delivered from Cape Helles in the direction of Krithia. In this latter action French troops played a prominent part and showed to high advantage their usual gallantry and fine fighting qualities.

The attack from Anzac, after a series of hotly contested actions, was carried to the summit of Sari Bair and Chunuk Bair, dominating positions in this area. The arrival of transports and the disembarkation of troops in Suvla Bay were designed to enable troops to support this attack. Unfortunately, however, the advance from Suvla Bay was not developed quickly enough, and the movement forward was brought to a standstill after an advance of about two and one-half miles.

The result was that the troops from Anzac were unable to retain their position on the crest of the hills, and after being repeatedly counter-attacked they were ordered to withdraw to positions lower down. These positions were effectively consolidated, and, joining with the line occupied by the Suvla Bay force, formed a connected front of more than twelve miles.

From the latter position a further attack on the Turkish entrenchments was delivered on the 21st, but after several hours of sharp fighting it was not found possible to gain the summit of the hills occupied by the enemy, and the intervening space being unsuitable for defense, the troops were withdrawn to their original position.

In the course of these operations the gallantry and resourcefulness of the Australian and New Zealand troops, frequently formed the subject of eulogy in General Hamilton's reports.

It is not easy to appreciate at their full value the enormous difficulties which attended the operations in the Dardanelles or the fine temper with which our troops met them.

There is not abundant evidence of a process of demoralization having set in among the German-led, or rather German-driven Turks, due no doubt, to their extremely heavy losses and to the progressive failure of their resources.

It is only fair to acknowledge that, judged from a humane point of view, the methods of warfare pursued by the Turks are vastly superior to those which have disgraced their German masters.

Throughout, the cooperation of the fleet was intensely valuable, and the concerted action between the sister services was in every way in the highest degree satisfactory.

FIELD REPORT OF GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON

THE first step in the real push the step which above all others was to count was the night attack on the summits of the Sari Bair ridge. The crest line of this lofty mountain range runs parallel to the sea, dominating the under features contained within the Anzac position, although these fortunately defilade the actual landing-place. From the main ridge a series of spurs run down towards the level beach, and are separated from one another by deep, jagged gullies choked up with dense jungle. . . . It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real prospect of success.

The two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns.

The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division.

Among other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H. M. S. "Colne," had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at 9 p. m., H. M. S. "Colne" threw the beams of her searchlight onto the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly ten minutes. Then, after a ten-minute interval, came a second illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9.20 and ending precisely at 9.30 p. m.