THE LIBERTY LOAN ARMY

By Guy Emerson, a Director of the Government Loan Organization.

IT was during the second Kaiserbattle of the Lys, April, 1918, that the Third Liberty Loan drive was made in the United States, as here recounted by the spokesman of the Government. It was put before the public on the anniversary of our entrance into the war, and the fact that the American soldiers were in the trenches brought the war closer home and made the success of the third loan drive a foregone conclusion. Aiming for $3,000,000,000, it yielded $4,170,069,650 from 17,000,000 men, women and children.

As here stated, in reviewing the work of the Liberty Loan Army, besides that of the American forces in the field and at sea, "The enemy understood the futility of trying to defeat a people that enlisted against him 22,777,680 (loan subscribers) at home, 4,000,000 (soldiers) in the field and 300,000 (sailors) on the water."

OUR army was our first line in the war against Germany. Our second line of offense and defense was the navy, and behind both stood another line without which neither the army nor the navy could have "carried on. This third force was the greatest unit ever marshaled in the history of this or any other country the Liberty Loan Army. Before a man in the United States uniform entered a trench, before the first depth bomb had been dropped on a U-boat, this army, which finally carried a roster of 22,777,680 names, had entered the war.

Think of it! One person in every five in the immense population was in the war!

True, their contribution to the eventual triumph of our arms was measured in dollars while that of the men at the front or on the seas was in lives or limbs. Yet it is a fact that dollars were as powerful relatively as men in bringing the Boche to bay.

Various causes have been given to account for the startlingly sudden collapse of the Kaiser's army. Some say that the Allies' superior military strategy brought it to its knees. Others contend that success against the U-boats broke it down. Both are partly right, for each helped to undermine the German morale. But however great the contribution of both was, it is safe to say that the front presented by the Liberty Loan Army was a vital factor. The belated German consciousness that the United States as a whole was in the war, as tangibly represented in the strength of the Liberty Loan Army, helped to shatter the Germans' will to victory. As much as the men in khaki or in blue, this gigantic unit bore in upon his mind as an unyielding opponent. He understood the futility of trying to defeat a people that enlisted against him to the number of 22,777,680 at home, 4,000,000 in the field and 300,000 on the water.

There is another angle to this important element of morale. In inverse ratio to the weakening of the spirit of the Germans against this resistless body there came a daily strengthening of the morale of our own men and those of the Allies through this manifestation at home. Where there are two opposing wills to victory in the field, the one that has the greater backing at home is certain to overwhelm the other.

It was not the dollar that won the war, it was the spirit behind the dollar. Before Prince Max asked for the armistice he had learned that $9,978,835,800 had been subscribed in this country toward his defeat. It is natural to assume that this fact did not impress him so much as the related fact that millions of persons had participated in the subscription.

Up to the end of the Fourth Loan, which coincided with the negotiations for the Armistice, $16,971,909,050 had been paid in and this helped to save life to an extent that we can only imagine. It was the confident expectation when the Americans halted the German onslaught at Chateau-Thierry that the end of the war would come in the following spring. None dared to hope that it would come before Christmas. When the crash came in November, even the Allied commanders were bewildered by its suddenness. Had the war been prolonged to the spring of 1919, it is certain that we would have paid a large toll in lives. Some have estimated that 100,000 more of our young men would have been sacrificed. That the war did not drag along for six months more may be ascribed in part to the effect that the demonstrated loyalty of the Liberty Loan Army had upon German morale.

AMERICAN TROOPS TAKE CANTIGNY

From General Pershing's Report.

IN this first independent American attack, May 28, 1918, the 1st Division of the A. E. F. took the village of Cantigny in forty minutes, consolidated it into an American position and held it against repeated artillery and infantry counter-assaults. It had not been planned originally to have American troops engage the enemy in force until 1919, but the Allies were so hard pressed that the French Government was on the eve of abandoning Paris again. Nearly a million citizens fled from the city during May and June.

The violent effort of the Germans to re-take Cantigny was dictated by the fact that this was the Americans' first appearance as a unit and the enemy did not relish a defeat. The effect of Cantigny upon our Allies was electrifying. Foch no longer questioned the power lurking in the American attack and immediately began entrenching our troops, of which only 300,000 were then in France.

ON March 21 [1918] approximately 300,000 American troops had reached France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French or British divisions, were available the 1st and 2d then in line, and the 26th and 42d just withdrawn from line after one month's trench warfare training. The last two divisions at once began taking over quiet sectors to release divisions for the battle; the 26th relieved the 1st Division, which was sent to northwest of Paris in reserve; the 42d relieved two French divisions from quiet sectors. In addition to these troops, one regiment of the 93d Division was with the French in the Argonne, the 41st Depot Division was in the Service of Supply, and three divisions (3d, 32d and 5th) were arriving.

On 25 April the 1st Division relieved two French divisions on the front near Montdidier and on May 28 captured the important observation stations on the heights of Cantigny with splendid dash. French artillery, aviation, tanks and flame throwers aided in the attack, but most of this French assistance was withdrawn before the completion of the operation, in order to meet the enemy's new offensive launched May 27 toward Chateau-Thierry. The enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely violent and apparently he was determined at all costs to counteract the most excellent effect the American success had produced. For three days his guns of all calibers were concentrated on our new position and counter-attack succeeded counter-attack. The desperate efforts of the Germans gave the fighting at Cantigny a seeming tactical importance entirely out of proportion to the numbers involved.

Of the three divisions arriving in France when the first German offensive began, the 32d, intended for replacements, had been temporarily employed in the Service of Supply to meet a shortage of personnel, but the critical situation caused it to be reassembled, and by May 21 it was entering the line in the Vosges. At this time the 5th Division, though still incomplete, was also ordered into the line in the same region. The 3d Division was assembling in its training area and the 3d Corps staff had just been organized to administer these three divisions. In addition to the eight divisions already mentioned, the 28th and 77th had arrived in the British area and the 4th, 27th, 13th, 33d, and 35th and 82d were arriving there. Following the agreements as to British shipping, our troops came so rapidly that by the end of May we had a force of 600,000 in France.

The third German offensive, on May 27, against the French on the Aisne, soon developed a desperate situation for the Allies. The 2d Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing to relieve the 1st Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity of the Meaux on May 31, and, early on the morning of June 1, was deployed across the Chateau-Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French line, where it stopped the German advance on Paris. At the same time the partially trained 3d Division was placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of the Marne, and its motorized machine-gun battalion succeeded in reaching Chateau-Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending that river crossing.

The enemy having been halted, the 2d Division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on June 4, which resulted in the capture of Belleau Woods after very severe fighting. The village of Bouresches was taken soon after, and on July 1 Vaux was captured. In these operations the 2d Division met with most desperate resistance by Germany's best troops.